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Sixth Amendment Limits on Collateral
Uses of Uncounseled Convictions
The Sixth Amendment guarantees indigent criminal defendants a right
to appointed counsel in federal cases that threaten their life or liberty,, in
state felony cases,2 and in state misdemeanor cases that result in imprison-
ment.' When appointed counsel is denied in such cases, convictions are
retroactively held unconstitutional.4 Until recently, such convictions could
not be used for collateral purposes such as sentencing decisions,' recidivist
statutes,6 and impeachment.7
In Lewis v. United States,8 however, the Supreme Court permitted the
collateral use of an unconstitutional uncounseled conviction. The Court
allowed it to be counted as a prior conviction for purposes of a federal law
that punished with imprisonment the possession of a gun by a convicted
felon.' Because the holding in Lewis appears inconsistent with earlier de-
cisions that prohibited other collateral uses of such convictions," Lewis
has been described as an aberration."
This Note proposes a Sixth Amendment rule that strikes a compromise
between the competing values underlying Lewis and other Sixth Amend-
ment decisions, while still leaving the holdings of those cases intact. The
proposed rule prohibits the collateral use of uncounseled convictions when
there is a reasonable alternative means of advancing the government's in-
terest. When there is no such alternative, the rule would permit the gov-
ernment to use uncounseled convictions collaterally (1) if no independent
constitutional rights are themselves restricted and (2) if the government
provides access to an application process that enables the individual to
1. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468 (1938).
2. Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335, 339-40, 342, 345 (1963); see Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S.
367, 371 (1979).
3. Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 222-24 (1980) (per curiam); Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367,
373-74 (1979).
4. See, e.g., Kitchens v. Smith, 401 U.S. 847 (1971); Pickelsheimer v. Wainright, 375 U.S. 2
(1964).
5. United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 448-49 (1972).
6. Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 115-16 (1967).
7. Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473, 483 (1972); Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 115 (1967).
8. 445 U.S. 55 (1980).
9. Id. at 65-67.
10. See, e.g., Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473, 483 (1972) (collateral use of unconstitutional uncoun-
seled conviction to impeach defendant's credibility prohibited); Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 115-
16 (1967) (collateral use of unconstitutional uncounseled conviction to support prosecution of recidi-
vism unconstitutional).
11. See Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 71-72 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Recent
Cases, Constitutional Law. Sixth Amendment-Right to Counsel-Use of Prior Uncounscled Convic-
tions, 14 AKRON L. REV. 155, 159-61 (1980).
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show why the uncounseled conviction should not be used or why its use
should receive special consideration.
I. The Underlying Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel
In Johnson v. Zerbst, the Supreme Court recognized that without the
assistance of counsel even the intelligent layman usually "lacks both the
skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he
have a perfect one." 1 2 On the basis of this observation," Johnson held that
the Sixth Amendment " requires the federal government to appoint coun-
sel for criminal defendants who are unable to obtain counsel themselves,
who have not waived their constitutional right to counsel, and whose life,
or liberty is in jeopardy."
Gideon v. Wainwright built on Johnson by holding that indigent crimi-
nal defendants' Sixth Amendment right to appointed counsel is a funda-
mental right necessary to ensure the right to a fair trial and the funda-
12. 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938). The Johnson opinion went on to quote from Powell v. Alabama to
the effect that the
right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to
be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no
skill in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for
himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence.
Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted
upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible .
He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him.
Id. at 463 (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932)). These observations have sup-
ported the rationale of many later Sixth Amendment decisions. See, e.g., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407
U.S. 25, 31, 32 & n.3 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963).
13. The Johnson opinion ignored substantial evidence that the Framers of the Bill of Rights did
not intend to have the Sixth Amendment include the right to appointed counsel. W. BEANEY, THE
RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS 42, 44 (1955).
14. Prior to Johnson, the Supreme Court had not construed the Sixth Amendment to include the
right of indigent defendants to have counsel appointed for them at government expense. W. BEANEY,
supra note 13, at 32, 43-44; see Herman & Thompson, Scott v. Illinois and the Right to Counsel: A
Decision in Search of a Doctrine? 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 71, 72-73 (1979). One earlier Supreme
Court case acknowledged the existence of a constitutional right to appointed counsel, albeit on due
process grounds. In that case, the Court held that the appointment of counsel only on the morning of
trial denied a fair trial to defendants whose conviction resulted in a death sentence. Powell v. Ala-
bama, 287 U.S. 45, 56, 71 (1932).
The terms of the Sixth Amendment do not establish the right to appointed counsel. See U.S.
CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence.") In fact, it is doubtful that the Framers of the Bill of Rights
intended the Sixth Amendment to guarantee any right other than the right of a criminal defendant in
federal court to employ a lawyer to assist in his defense. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 370 (1979)
(citing W. BEANEY, supra note 13, at 27-30).
15. 304 U.S. 458, 468 (1938); see W. BEANEY, supra note 13, at 42-53; Note, Argersinger v.
Hamlin and the Collateral Use of Prior Misdemeanor Convictions of Indigents Unrepresented by
Counsel at Trial, 35 OHIO ST. L.J. 168, 168 n.3 (1974). Because Johnson involved a felony convic-
tion, some commentators suggest its holding is limited to felony cases, see Herman & Thompson,
supra note 14, at 73, but Johnson itself states otherwise, 304 U.S. at 463, 468, and it has not been
limited by later cases.
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mental human rights of life and liberty.' 6 Gideon further held that the
fundamental nature of the right to appointed counsel made it obligatory
on the states through its incorporation in the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.17
The Supreme Court halted the gradual expansion of the Sixth Amend-
ment right to appointed counsel in Scott v. Illinois."8 Scott recognized that
the Sixth Amendment, as incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment,
prohibits the imposition of a criminal sanction as severe as incarceration
unless an indigent criminal defendant has been offered appointed counsel,
regardless of the cost to the states.'9 But, in an opinion that is inconsistent
with the rationales of earlier decisions, 0 though not with their holdings,
the Scott Court held that the Sixth Amendment did not require states to
appoint counsel for indigent misdemeanor defendants who were not to be
punished with incarceration. 2' In support of this result, the Court ob-
16. 372 U.S. 335, 343-44 (1973).
17. Id. at 342. The Gideon Court's discussion of the application of the Sixth Amendment to state
criminal cases began with the observation that in federal courts the Sixth Amendment requires that
counsel be provided for all criminal defendants who are unable to employ counsel. Id. at 340 (citing
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938)). The Court went on to agree with Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S.
455 (1972), "that a provision of the Bill of Rights which is 'fundamental and essential to a fair trial'
is made obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth Amendment," but overruled Betts as an "anach-
ronism when handed down" for its holding that the Sixth Amendment right to appointed counsel was
not a fundamental right essential to a fair trial. 372 U.S. at 342-45. The Betts approach of determin-
ing the right to appointed counsel on the basis of the special circumstances of the case, see 316 U.S. at
471-73, was thus firmly rejected. 372 U.S. at 339.
The majority opinion's broad language, and a disagreement in two of the concurring opinions about
whether the decision fully incorporates the Sixth Amendment into the Fourteenth Amendment, re-
sulted in some uncertainty over whether the decision was limited to its factual context. But the major-
ity opinion suggests that such a limitation is inappropriate, 372 U.S. at 339-45; moreover, on the
same day Gideon was decided, the Court vacated an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction and re-
manded it to the state court for reconsideration in light of Gideon. Patterson v. Warden, 372 U.S. 776
(1963). Various state and federal courts nevertheless split over Gideon's meaning, and several Su-
preme Court decisions referred to Gideon as applying to felony cases without raising the issue of
whether it extended to other criminal cases as well. See, e.g., Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 371
(1979); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 31-32 (1972); Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 114
(1967); cf. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 378 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (Gideon extended to
all criminal prosecutions).
18. 440 U.S. 367 (1979). For a thorough discussion of Scott, see Herman & Thompson, supra
note 14; Note, The Outer Limits of the Indigent's Right to Appointed Counsel, 5 U. DAYTON L. REV.
177 (1980); Note, Scott v. Illinois: The Right to Counsel Retreats, 41 U. PITT. L. REV. 647 (1980).
19. 440 U.S. 367, 372-73 (1979).
20. See supra pp. 1001-02.
21. 440 U.S. 367, 372-74 (1979). Although Scott "hold[s] that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments. . . require only that no indigent defendant be sentenced to a term of imprisonment unless the
State has afforded him the right to. . . appointed counsel," 440 U.S. at 373-74, the opinion appears
to accept Gideon as requiring counsel to be appointed for all indigent felony defendants, including
those who are not imprisoned. Id. at 371, 373-74. Because the defendant in Gideon received a prison
sentence, the Scott opinion is consistent with Gideon's results irrespective of whether the Scott rule
affords Sixth Amendment protection to indigent felony defendants who are not imprisoned.
Scott is generally thought to apply only to state misdemeanor convictions. See Baldasar v. Illinois,
446 U.S. 222, 222 (1980) (per curiam) (Powell, J., dissenting); Note, Constitutional Law-Criminal
Procedure-Right to Counsel-Indigent Misdemeanor Defendant Not Entitled to Court Appointed
Attorney Unless Sentenced to Actual Confinement, Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979), 9 U. BALT.
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served that the Framers of the Bill of Rights intended the Sixth Amend-
ment to guarantee only the right to retained counsel, 22 that the incorpora-
tion of the Sixth Amendment in the Fourteenth Amendment has special
difficulties because state laws regulate a broader range of human affairs
than do federal laws,2' and that these differences justified the decision not
to extrapolate further the already extended line of the right to appointed
counsel.
24
Scott then balanced the states' interests in the efficient administration of
justice against criminal defendants' interests in having appointed counsel.
To the extent Gideon suggested that indigent criminal defendants' inter-
ests automatically outweighed the government's interests, and that all in-
digent criminal defendants were therefore entitled to appointed counsel,
Scotts reevaluation of governmental interests in determining the limits of
the Sixth Amendment retroactively changed Gideon's rationale. But be-
cause the application of the Scott decision to the Gideon facts would not
have altered Gideon's result, the Scott court was able to limit Gideon
without overturning it.
25
II. Competing Views on Collateral Use of Uncounseled Convictions
Until recently, collateral use of uncounseled convictions26 has generally
been prohibited.27 In 1980, however, in Lewis v. United States, the Su-
L. REV. 453, 466 (1980). For a discussion of other areas of confusion generated by Scott, see Herman
& Thompson, supra note 14, at 91-95. For criticisms of Scott's inconsistency with prior rationales and
opinions (albeit not their results), and its creation of an illogical boundary for the Sixth Amendment
right to appointed counsel, see id. at 91-98; Note, The Outer Limits of the Indigent's Right to Coun-
sel, supra note 18, at 181-86; Note, Scott v. Illinois, supra note 18, at 647, 655-61.
22. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 370 (1979).
23. Id. at 372.
24. Id.
25. Scott follows Gideon in rejecting a balancing test that makes the right to counsel dependent
upon the particular circumstances of each case. The fixed Sixth Amendment line drawn in Scott is less
inclusive than the one suggested in Gideon, but both lines require appointment of counsel for indigent
defendants such as the defendant in Gideon, who was imprisoned for a felony conviction.
26. "Uncounseled convictions" shall hereinafter refer to outstanding prior convictions that resulted
from criminal proceedings in which the defendant was unable to obtain counsel for himself, did not
waive his right to counsel, and did not have the assistance of counsel at the critical stages of prosecu-
tion. All such convictions are unconstitutional except for state misdemeanor convictions that are not
punished with incarceration. See supra p. 1002.
Collateral use of uncounseled convictions resulting from state misdemeanors is constitutional for
any purpose except for proceedings that result in imprisonment. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373
(1979). To avoid repetition, this exception should be considered implicit in subsequent references to
the permitted uses of uncounseled convictions.
27. Note, supra note 15, at 176-82; see supra p. 1000. Because criminal convictions are considered
particularly reliable, see In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (guilt in criminal case must be proven
beyond reasonable doubt); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174 (1949) (same), they are
frequently used to provide information for a variety of collateral purposes, including sentencing deci-
sions, recidivist statutes, revocation of probation or parole, denial of professional and occupational
licenses, denial of government jobs, disenfranchisement, and prohibition of ownership of explosives.
All fifty states and the federal government use criminal convictions for a number of collateral pur-
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preme Court permitted the collateral use of an uncounseled felony convic-
tion, without overruling previous Sixth Amendment decisions." The re-
sultant doctrinal confusion has yet to be resolved.
A. The Traditional View
Burgett v. Texas29 reflects the traditional view of the collateral use of
uncounseled convictions. According to the Court in Burgett, permitting a
conviction deficient under Gideon "to be used against a person either to
support guilt or enhance punishment for another offense... erode[s] the
principle of that case"3 0 and makes the accused "suffe[r] anew from the
deprivation of [his] Sixth Amendment right."" The Court thus held that
an uncounseled conviction could not count as a prior conviction for pur-
poses of a recidivist statute that operated to enhance jail sentences. For
similar reasons, United States v. Tucker barred the inclusion of an un-
counseled conviction in the set of factors to be considered by a judge when
sentencing a defendant for a subsequent crime,3 and Loper v. Beto held
that an uncounseled conviction could not be used to impeach a defendant's
poses. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 48 & n.l1 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring); Duke, The
Right to Appointed Counsel; Argersinger and Beyond, 12 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 601, 615-17 (1975);
Project, The Collateral Consequences of a Criminal Conviction, 23 VAND. L. REV. 929, passim
(1970).
28. 445 U.S. 55 (1980).
29. 389 U.S. 109 (1967).
30. Permitting collateral use would erode the right to counsel because the government might have
less incentive to provide counsel in the first proceeding: even though Gideon and Scott already strongly
deter the government from denying counsel where the resulting conviction is unconstitutional in the
first instance, the ban on collateral use would deter the government from seeking uncounseled convic-
tions constitutional under Scott that the government could use collaterally in proceedings resulting in
imprisonment. The ban on collateral use also prevents the moral injustice of allowing the government
to benefit from its previous wrong-deprivation of the right to appointed counsel in a prior case. The
courts in fact have protected individuals from prosecution based on an uncounseled conviction. E.g.,
Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222 (1980) (per curiam); City of Monroe v. Fincher, 305 So. 2d 108
(La. 1974); cf Alexander v. State, 258 Ark. 633, 527 S.W.2d 927 (1975) (uncounseled conviction not
basis for revocation of suspended sentence). Contra Aldrighetti v. State, 507 S.W.2d 770 (1974) (un-
counseled conviction not punished with incarceration can be used to impeach defendant or enhance
prison term); State v. McGrew, 127 N.J. Super. 327, 317 A.2d 390 (1974) (uncounseled conviction
not punished with incarceration can support conviction under recidivist statute requiring mandatory
incarceration).
31. Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 115 (1967).
32. Id. The many different types of recidivist statutes (also called enhancement, habitual criminal
and repeat offender statutes) generally upgrade the classification or punishment for specified types of
future criminal convictions. The Texas statute whose application was invalidated in Burgett automati-
cally raised the punishment for a non-capital felony conviction to the highest punishment ordinarily
possible if it was proved that the defendant had already been convicted of a similar offense. TEX.
PENAL CODE art. 62 (1952). See generally Note, supra note 15, at 176-79 (discussing use of invalid
convictions to enhance punishment).
33. 404 U.S. 443, 446, 449 (1972) (affirming decision of circuit court to remand "the case to the
District Court for resentencing 'without consideration of any prior convictions which are invalid under




B. The Lewis Court's View
The Supreme Court first upheld the collateral use of an uncounseled
conviction in Lewis v. United States.35 Lewis held that an uncounseled
felony conviction that was deficient under Gideon could constitutionally be
counted as a prior conviction for purposes of a federal statute that made it
a crime for convicted felons to possess a gun.6
The Court noted that the firearm disability did not violate constitu-
tional equal protection requirements because Congress had "some 'ra-
tional basis' for the statutory distinctions made,"37 because the disability
was not "based upon constitutionally suspect criteria,"38 and because it did
"not trench upon constitutionally protected liberties."39 The Sixth Amend-
ment, the Court continued, allows the government to use an uncounseled
conviction collaterally to impose an essentially civil disability when the
government's use of the conviction depends only on the existence of the
conviction, and not on its reliability."' The Lewis majority concluded that
the Sixth Amendment allows the government to enforce such a disability
with criminal sanctions because in so doing the government does not "sup-
port guilt or enhance punishment" for a disability that was irrationally
34. 405 U.S. 473, 483 (1972); accord Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 60 (1980) (dictum).
35. 445 U.S. 55 (1980).
36. Id. at 65-68. The defendant in Lewis was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. app. § 1202(a)(1)
(1976), a provision of the Gun Control Act of 1968. Section 1202(a) states in part:
Any person who-(1) has been convicted by a court of the United States or of a State or any
political subdivision thereof of a felony. . . and who receives, possesses, or transports in com-
merce or affecting commerce. . . any firearm shall be fined not more than $10,000 or impris-
oned for not more than two years, or both.
For an analysis of the Gun Control Act, see Note, Prior Convictions and the Gun Control Act of
1968, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 326 (1976). For an analysis of the circuit court opinions that gave rise to
Lewis, see Case Comment, The Use of Prior Uncounseled Convictions in Federal Gun Control Prose-
cutions: United States v. Lewis, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1790 (1979).
37. 445 U.S. 55, 65 (1980) (quoting Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417, 422 (1974); Mc-
Ginnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 270 (1973), and Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 111 (1979)).
38. 445 U.S. at 65 n.8.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 67. The similarity between the firearm statute upheld in Lewis and the recidivist statute
struck down in Burgett casts doubt upon Burgett and its progeny. Concededly, the statutes are not
identical: the former statute imposes punishment for certain activities if the defendant has a prior
conviction, 18 U.S.C. app. § 1202 (a)(1) (1976), while the latter statute increases punishment for
certain activities if the defendant has a prior conviction, TEX. PENAL CODE art. 62 (1952). A simple
hypothetical, however, demonstrates the difficulty of transforming this factual difference into a princi-
pled distinction. A legislature in a state that punishes driving in excess of fifty-five miles per hour
with a fine could attempt to protect the public from those individuals who have outstanding drunk
driving convictions (including convictions in violation of Gideon) by making it a felony punishable
with imprisonment for those individuals to drive. Or the legislature could make it a felony punishable
with imprisonment for those individuals to drive faster than fifty-five miles per hour. Despite the
similar purpose and effect of the two hypothetical stautes, the first type of statute wouldzbe constitu-
tional under Lewis while the second type of statute would be unconstitutional under Burgett.
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imposed.' Under this view, the Sixth Amendment bars the collateral use
of uncounseled convictions only when the government seeks to impose a
criminal disability directly, or to enforce a non-criminal disability that is
not rationally based on an uncounseled conviction.
C. The Conflict
The Lewis Court's view is inconsistent with earlier Sixth Amendment
decisions. Lewis focuses on the government's interest in using uncounseled
convictions, but never mentions the individual's Sixth Amendment interest
in protecting himself from the collateral use of such convictions. The
Lewis Court is thus willing to defer to the government's interest in the
collateral use of prior convictions to "support guilt or enhance punish-
ment" if that use is rational.42
In contrast, other opinions focus on the individual's interests and seek to
prevent the erosion of his Sixth Amendment rights. These decisions shield
the individual from any punishment that could not be directly imposed for
an uncounseled conviction when the government seeks to support or en-
hance such a punishment through the collateral use of an uncounseled
conviction.43 This approach protects the individual from all collateral uses
of all uncounseled convictions except those convictions that are constitu-
tional under Scott and those uses that do not support or enhance
incarceration.
The only paragraph in Lewis that attempts to resolve the apparent con-
flict 4 with earlier cases asserts that, in Burgett, Tucker, and Loper, the
subsequent conviction or sentence depended on the reliability of the prior
conviction, while in Lewis, the subsequent conviction depended only on
the fact of the prior conviction.4 The Lewis opinion, however, did not
41. 445 U.S. at 67 (quoting Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 115 (1967)). Lewis held that the
conviction was not unreliable for the purpose of imposing the firearm disability, id., which it found
had met the requirement of a rational basis for the statutory distinctions made. Id. at 66.
42. The Lewis opinion is similar to Scott in that it changes the meaning of the Sixth Amendment
while explicitly accepting the results of earlier decisions. See supra p. 1003. Both cases limit the
rationales supporting earlier Supreme Court rulings by finding government interests that preclude a
particular extension of Sixth Amendment rights. Lewis differs from Scott, however, in its failure to
offer a Sixth Amendment rule that is consistent with the results of other decisions.
43. See supra pp. 1003-1004.
44. Lewis explicitly accepted Burgett, Loper, and Tucker, and denied any inconsistency with
those decisions. 445 U.S. 55, 60, 67 (1980).
45. 445 U.S. 55, 66-67 (1980). The Lewis Court defended its interpretation by emphasizing that
Congress could rationally base its regulation of guns on the fact of a prior conviction, even an uncoun-
seled and hence unreliable conviction. Id. The Court suggested that collateral use of uncounseled
convictions had been prohibited in Burgett, Tucker and Loper because in those cases the Court found
either that the government had not intended to use unreliable convictions or that use of such convic-
tions was not rational. Id.
This suggestion is not borne out by the facts of those cases. Burgett was convicted of "assault with
malice aforethought with intent to commit murder; repetition of offense," 389 U.S. 109, 110 (1967),
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explain why the convictions struck down in Burgett, Tucker, and Loper
must be construed as depending on the reliability, rather than the fact, of
the prior convictions. Moreover, the opinion fails to explain why the Sixth
Amendment would require a more reliable prior conviction in those cases
than in Lewis.4"
Decided only two months after Lewis, Baldasar v. Ilinois7 accentuates
Lewis's inconsistency with Burgett. Baldasar held that an uncounseled
misdemeanor conviction, though constitutional under Scott, could not
for violating a Texas statute that governs defendants who have been "convicted of the same offense, or
one of the same nature." Id. at 111 n.3. The only prior conviction admitted into evidence was an
outstanding uncounseled conviction. Burgett did not conclude that the Texas legislature intended to
exempt from regulation individuals with allegedly uncounseled convictions or that the regulation of
those individuals was irrational. Instead, the Court said that the Sixth Amendment prohibited use of
an uncounseled conviction "to support guilt or enhance punishment for another offense." Id. at 115.
Tucker and Loper also do not support the view that Sixth Amendment protection would not have
been found to exist in those cases if the government had not depended on the reliability of the uncoun-
seled convictions; instead the opinions suggest that such a finding might have made the Sixth Amend-
ment violation a harmless error. Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473, 483-84 (1972); United States v. Tucker,
404 U.S. 443, 447-49 (1972).
Burgett, Tucker and Loper not only cannot be distinguished in the manner suggested by Lewis,
their opinions dictate a different result. Lewis's prior conviction was obtained in violation of Gideon,
was necessary to establish his guilt under the gun law, and resulted in his punishment for a gun-law
offense. This result is in direct contravention of a statement made in Burgett that "a conviction ob-
tained in violation of Gideon v. Wainwright [cannot] be used against a person to support guilt or
enhance punishment for another offense . . . ." Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 115 (1967). This
statement is quoted in both Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 449 (1972), and Loper, 405 U.S. 473, 481 (1972).
46. The Lewis Court's argument was augmented only by the claim that, unlike the situation in
Burgett, the sanction imposed by the gun law attaches immediately upon the defendant's predicate
uncounseled conviction. 445 U.S. 55, 67 (1980). The significance of this distinction, which the Court
did not explain, seems tenuous: under both the recidivist statute in Burgett and the gun law in Lewis,
the sanction of incarceration attached upon a conviction for violation of a criminal law that makes a
prior uncounseled conviction an element of the crime.
In support of Lewis, it might be argued that the collateral use of an uncounseled conviction by the
recidivist statute struck down in Burgett was very different from its use in Lewis. Violation of the
recidivist statute in Burgett appears to require two guilty acts; hence, under the statute, an uncoun-
seled conviction operated as a perfect substitute for a constitutional conviction. In contrast, the firearm
statute in Lewis appeared consciously to use an uncounseled conviction only as a rational source of
predictive information about an individual for legitimate regulatory purposes.
Both statutes, however, used the prior conviction to advance legitimate regulatory purposes and
both cases decided the constitutionality of punishment for violation of the subsequent offense. If either
statute punished the violation of both the prior conviction and the subsequent conviction, it would be
invalid for double jeopardy reasons. Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 227 (1980) (Marshall, J.,
concurring). Another problem with this argument is that it would uphold recidivist statutes if they
were rewritten so as to rely only on the fact of a prior conviction as a source of predictive information
rationally used as a basis for statutory distinctions. A straightforward reading of Burgett would not
allow its constitutional holding to be so easily skirted.
Lewis did not even attempt to show why Tucker or Loper should be construed to require a more
reliable conviction than Lewis. Tucker, at least, cannot be construed to require a more reliable convic-
tion than Lewis. Tucker held that the Sixth Amendment barred the consideration of an uncounseled
conviction in sentencing decisions even though it stated that a judge may make a sentencing decision
on the basis of almost any type of information. 404 U.S. 443, 446 (1972). Tucker considered the
mistakenly presumed liability of the uncounseled conviction only to determine whether the sentencing
error might have resulted in a different sentence, and hence whether the error was a reversible one.
See id. at 448-49.
47. 446 U.S. 222 (1980).
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count as a predicate conviction for purposes of a recidivist statute."
Baldasar poses a strong challenge to Lewis because, unlike Burgett and
Lewis, the collateral use challenged in Baldasar relied on a constitutional
uncounseled conviction. Under Scott, such convictions may result in a
criminal fine and in civil disabilities such as the loss of the right to vote or
the loss of a professional license49-sanctions that are often more severe
than the loss of the right to possess a gun. Because Scott allows a state to
impose these sanctions, one might expect that a state would be permitted
rational means of enforcing them, including incarceration. 0 But Baldasar,
in consonance with Burgett and seemingly in violent conflict with Lewis,51
held that even a constitutional uncounseled conviction could not support a
subsequent conviction that results in incarceration.
Had Baldasar not followed Lewis, Lewis might reasonably be viewed
as signaling a severe doctrinal shift, with the promise of later explanation.
Together, the opinions present the appearance of a confused Court ex-
pounding conflicting doctrines. When the Court recognizes the conflict, it
will have to overturn one or more decisions or adopt a rnew Sixth Amend-
ment rule that is consistent with the results of all the cases.
III. A Compromise Between the Competing Views
This section proposes a rule that is a compromise between the compet-
ing views of the Sixth Amendment. The proposed rule is structured to
accommodate both the values underlying the competing views and the ac-
tual holdings of the cases.
A. Proposed Rule
The proposed Sixth Amendment rule imposes three conditions for the
48. Id. at 224.
49. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. 8, § 182 (conviction for specified types of crimes disqualifies one
from voting); Bromberger, Rehabilitation and Occupational Licensing: A Conflict of Interests, 13
WM. & MARY L. REV. 794 (1972); Duke, supra note 27, at 614-17; Project, supra note 27.
50. See Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 60 (1980). Virtually the only direct sanctions for
misdemeanor convictions in this country are imprisonment, fines, or a combination of the two. Thus,
statutes often provide that defendants who do not pay a fine be imprisoned until the fine is paid or for
a specified amount of time, and often punish the violation of a civil disability with imprisonment. E.g.,
GA. CODE ANN. § 34-9907 (1962) (individual who votes illegally after being convicted of disqualify-
ing crime is guilty of misdemeanor punishable with incarceration); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 99-19-19,
99-13-11 (1972) (convicts to be imprisoned until fine is fully paid); see Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S.
235, 246-59 app. (1970); Duke, supra note 27, at 614; Project, supra note 27, passim. It is not clear,
however, whether a person may be jailed for failure to pay a fine if he has no means to pay. Tate v.
Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971) (equal protection clause forbids greater jail term for indigent's non-pay-
ment of fine than could be imposed directly for conviction resulting in fine).
51. The dissent in Baldasar points out that the conflict between the holdings of Lewis and
Baldasar "could scarcely be more violent." Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 234 n.3 (1980) (Powell,
J., dissenting).
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collateral use of an uncounseled conviction. First, it requires that indepen-
dent constitutional rights not be infringed as a result of the use of an
uncounseled conviction. Second, it allows the government to use an un-
counseled conviction collaterally only if the government has no reasonable
alternative. Third, the rule requires the government to provide access to
an informal application process that can eliminate or modify the collateral
use of an uncounseled conviction.
1. Constitutional Rights Not Implicated
Constitutional counseled convictions can be used collaterally to restrict
certain constitutionally protected rights of affected individuals during and
even after their punishment.5 2 Because uncounseled convictions are inher-
ently unreliable, the proposed Sixth Amendment rule would not allow the
government to use an uncounseled conviction collaterally in a way that
directly restricts such rights."s Regulations that are properly based on an
uncounseled conviction, however, could be enforced with sanctions that
restrict constitutional rights. Thus, an uncounseled conviction could not be
used collaterally to restrict an individual's right to interstate travel, but
punishment for a violation of a regulation properly based on an uncoun-
seled conviction could include restrictions on the right to interstate travel.
2. No Reasonable Alternative
The proposed Sixth Amendment rule would proscribe the collateral use
of uncounseled convictions unless the government can find no reasonable
alternative method of advancing its interest54 that encroaches less on the
interests of the individual defendant." A court could find that no such
reasonable alternative exists if all the alternatives are unacceptably costly
in economic or other terms. The government would not be required to
advance one interest to the exclusion of all other interests. Thus uncoun-
seled convictions could be used if the government has no reasonable alter-
native means available to determine which individuals should be subject to
52. See Richards v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974) (state legislature allowed to prohibit individuals
with outstanding counseled convictions from voting).
53. Cf Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343-44 (1963)(uncounseled conviction too unrelia-
ble for deprivation of fundamental rights).
54. Because the government's use of an uncounseled conviction infringes on significant interests,
the use must have a fair and substantial relation to important government interests to satisfy equal
protection guarantees of the due process clause.
55. Analogous constitutional rules govern government actions that infringe on constitutional rights
such as freedom of speech and free exercise of religion. Such infringements are not allowed unless the
government is pursuing the alternative that is the least restrictive of constitutional rights. For a discus-
sion of these rules, see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 410, 684-87, 846-59, 861 n.11
(1978).
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the desired regulation.16
The government does not have the alternative of curing the deficiency57
of an uncounseled conviction unless the affected individual appeals the
conviction. If the affected individual does successfully appeal, the govern-
ment cannot constitutionally regulate his activities on the basis of the va-
cated or reversed conviction. 8 Except in an unusual case, however, where
the defect in the conviction affects the validity of the indictment, 9 the per-
son who successfully challenges his prior conviction can constitutionally be
retried with counsel.'0 The government can then regulate the individual
on the basis of the indictment and any conviction that results. t
The proposed rule strikes a more 'ffective compromise between govern-
mental and individual interests. It permits the government to use uncoun-
seled convictions collaterally when the government has no reasonable al-
ternative. At the same time, because the government usually has a
56. Legislatures want to regulate certain classes of individuals because of rational assumptions
about characteristics of members of those classes. Individuals who are, for example, minors, aliens,
police officers, or accountants have special privileges and responsibilities.
The void for vagueness doctrine requires that membership in the regulated class can be reliably
determined. See Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453, 458 (1939) (holding statute unconstitu-
tionally vague for making it illegal to be a "gangster"). Thus membership in a regulated group cannot
be based on subjective criteria such as an individual's responsibility, intelligence, or specialized knowl-
edge. Regulation must instead be based on indicators that positively correlate with the preferred crite-
ria, indicators such as a criminal conviction, a test score, or a professional degree. A criminal convic-
tion is often an irreplaceable indicator of certain characteristics a government wants to establish for
purposes of regulation.
57. A government that wants to use an uncounseled conviction collaterally often does not have the
alternative of providing counsel at the prior trial. See, e.g., Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 56-57
(1980) (United States collaterally used Florida uncounseled conviction); United States v. Tucker, 404
U.S. 443, 444-46 (1972) (California proceeding collaterally used three of defendant's prior convictions
from two other states where all three convictions violated Gideon standard that retroactively applied to
them).
58. This issue has not been litigated, probably because the result would be dear. It would be
irrational to allow a legislature to permanently subject an individual to regulation on the basis of a
prior prosecution that culminated with the individual proving his innocence. A different conclusion
would undermine the constitutional presumption of innocence. See Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S.
55, 61 n.5 (1980) (dictum); id. at 69 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (dictum); Note, supra note 36, at 334
& n.42; infra note 61.
59. If the indictment was irreparably defective or the prosecution was unconstitutional for violat-
ing protections such as double jeopardy or speedy trial rules, the indictment cannot be used and a new
indictment cannot constitutionally be issued. See, e.g., Robinson v. Neil, 409 U.S. 505, 509 (1973)
(conviction that violates double jeopardy protection cannot be retried); United States v. United States
Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 723 (1971) (conviction under statute that violates Fifth Amendment
cannot be retried). Retrial would also be prohibited on double jeopardy grounds if the appellate rever-
sal was based on a conclusion that the evidence at trial was insufficient to sustain a guilty verdict.
Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1978).
60. Double jeopardy does not preclude the government from retrying a defendant whose convic-
tion is set aside because of an error in the proceedings leading to a conviction. United States v. Tateo,
377 U.S. 463, 465 (1964); see, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 341 n.9 (1975); Forman v.
United States, 361 U.S. 416, 425 (1960).
61. Regulation on the basis of an indictment is constitutional because of its practical necessity and
its temporary nature. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979). Such regulation is limited by the
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial.
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reasonable alternative, the rule provides the individual considerable pro-
tection from the erosion of his right to appointed counsel and from further
harm caused by an uncounseled conviction.
3. Special Application Process
Under the proposed rule, if the government has no reasonable alterna-
tive means of advancing its interests, it may use an uncounseled conviction
collaterally, but only if it provides the convicted person with access to an
informal application process that can prohibit or modify the use of the
conviction. The government should be allowed to determine the nature of
the application process as long as its decision is rational.62 To protect indi-
viduals from an arbitrary and capricious decision, or the appearance of
one, the government's decisions should be explained, and judicial review
should be available to ensure that the decision is not arbitrary and
capricious."
The burden of making an application process available discourages the
government from allowing collateral uses of uncounseled convictions when
its interest in such use is not great. In addition, the application process
partially remedies the flaw in the judicial process created by the absence
of counsel by preventing the government from automatically presuming
that an uncounseled conviction is as reliable as other convictions. A defen-
dant can insist that the government consider his interests and the circum-
stances of his prior conviction in evaluating the appropriateness of the
conviction's collateral use. The particularized information that the indi-
vidual can present forces the government to consider the individual's inter-
ests and discourages each collateral use that does not significantly advance
government interests.
The cost of providing access to the required application process should
not be unacceptably high. The proposed rule allows the government great
discretion in formulating an application process when it wants to use an
uncounseled conviction collaterally; presumably there will usually be an
inexpensive alternative. Furthermore, most of the government's collateral
uses of uncounseled convictions involve licensing or hiring procedures that
already require it to process applications." In those situations the require-
62. For instance, it would presumably not be rational to provide an application process that re-
quires the aid of an attorney, unless counsel is appointed for the indigent.
63. Cf Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 572-73 (1975) (of right petition to Secretary of
Labor for discretionary decision requires Secretary to issue "reasons" statement to assure careful ad-
ministrative decision; judicial review available, decision reversible if arbitrary or capricious); Kitchens
v. Department of Treasury, 535 F.2d 1197, 1199-1200 (1976) (application for discretionary relief
from firearm disability requires "statement of reasons"; judicial review available, decision reversible if
arbitrary or capricious).
64. See Project, supra note 27, passim.
1011
The Yale Law Journal
ment of considering the circumstances of the uncounseled conviction
should be a small burden. The few unlicensed activities the government
would be allowed to regulate on the basis of an uncounseled conviction,
and that the government has thus far shown an interest in regulating on
the basis of prior convictions, often will not advance government interests
sufficiently to justify both regulation consciously based on uncounseled
convictions and the establishment of the required application process. In
the remaining cases, the people who take the effort required to make a
special application will probably not unduly burden the government.
Because an application could be made without the benefit of counsel,65
the right to an individualized determination of the appropriateness of the
collateral use of an uncounseled conviction may be important to individu-
als who are sufficiently disadvantaged by the collateral use to apply for an
exemption. The opportunity should be especially useful to individuals
who have uncounseled convictions that cannot be reversed because they
are constitutional under Scott or that cannot be reversed in time to prevent
their collateral use. It should also benefit individuals who are able to use
the informal application process provided by the regulating government
but who are unable to appeal directly an unconstitutional uncounseled
conviction because they were convicted in a distant jurisdiction or because
they do not have the resources to make a judicial appeal. The right will
not, however, help the many individuals who lack sufficient knowledge,
foresight, or ability to use successfully an informal application process. 6
All three of the proposed requirements guard against erosion of Sixth
Amendment rights by limiting the government's opportunity to benefit
from the prosecution of uncounseled indigent defendants and by limiting
the circumstances under which the individual can suffer anew as a result
of an uncounseled conviction. On the other hand, where no independent
constitutional right is threatened, the requirements do not bar the govern-
ment from advancing its interests.
Admittedly, the proposed line is not as clearly drawn as that in Scott.
But unlike First Amendment rights that are often unacceptably chilled
when the extent of constitutional protection is unclear,' the Sixth Amend-
65. It should often be much easier to make an application in an informal forum in the jurisdiction
that is imposing a disability on the basis of an uncounseled conviction than it would be to appeal the
prior conviction in a court in the jurisdiction that imposed the conviction. This is especially true for
those who live far from the jurisdiction that imposed the uncounseled conviction, who cannot afford to
travel or hire a lawyer, and who want to remove a disability imposed by a government with local
offices.
66. This problem is inherent in any Sixth Amendment rule that is consonant with Lewis, and is a
strong argument for Lewis's reversal. It is also, unfortunately, a problem that permeates all rights and
privileges that must be defended or secured through judicial or administrative proceedings. The prob-
lem, however, is smaller than it would be under the Lewis rationale. See supra p. 1012.
67. The Supreme Court has ruled that all applications of a vague statuie that limits freedom of
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ment right to appointed counsel can be guarded through judicial scrutiny
of the facts supporting the government's use of an uncounseled
conviction."8
B. Applying the Proposed Rule to the Cases
Lewis v. United States. The Lewis Court allowed Congress to advance
its interest in prohibiting the possession of guns by what Congress ration-
ally believed were particularly irresponsible classes of individuals, includ-
ing the class composed of individuals with uncounseled convictions. 9 The
statutory scheme did not burden an independent constitutional right,7 and
it gave individuals who were subject to regulation on the basis of an un-
counseled conviction access to an application process that could remove
their disability.7'
Moreover, the alternative methods available to advance Congress' inter-
ests were arguably unsatisfactory. For example, Congress could have re-
quired everyone to apply for approval to possess a gun without infringing
anyone's right to counsel. This alternative, however, was not a reasonable
one for the courts to have mandated, because it would have required a
totally different statutory scheme, one that was far more intrusive than
necessary to fulfill Congress' interests.
The alternative of exempting from the gun law the relatively few indi-
viduals who have uncounseled convictions would have unduly restricted
Congress in regulating what it rationally considered to be a dangerous
activity. This alternative also might have undermined the effectiveness and
logic of the statutory scheme through which Congress intended to regulate
certain individuals' contact with firearms. Many individuals who other-
expression are unconstitutional because even a saving construction of the statute would be insufficient
to eliminate the deterrence of protected expression. See Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521, 527-28
(1972).
68. The proposed Sixth Amendment rule would not allow a disability that restricts constitutional
rights to be imposed on the basis of an uncounseled conviction. Hence possible uncertainty over
whether a prior conviction is an uncounseled conviction would not chill the exercise of any constitu-
tionally protected rights.
69. 445 U.S. at 66-67. The Court also noted that the gun law was not based on constitutionally
suspect criteria. Id. at 65 n.8.
70. The Lewis Court noted that the gun law did not deprive the defendant of a constitutionally
protected liberty on the basis of an uncounseled conviction, and suggested that it would have reached a
different result if such a right was restricted. See 445 U.S. at 65 n.8.
71. Id. at 64; see Kitchens v. Department of Treasury, 535 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir. 1976) (decision of
Treasury Secretary subject to judicial review); 18 U.S.C. app. § 1203(2) (1976) (disability may be
removed by qualifying pardon on consent of Treasury Secretary). The availability of the application
process did not affect the constitutional right to appeal a prior unconstitutional conviction. See FLA.
CONST. art. 5, § 5 (prior conviction may be reversed in coram nobis proceeding in Florida state
courts); 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1976) (federal habeas corpus relief may be available if state remedies are
exhausted). The Lewis Court said that the existence of these sources of relief prevents the gun law
from attaching irrevocable lifelong sanctions on the basis of an unreliable conviction. 445 U.S. at 64
n.7.
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wise clearly would have fallen within the terms of the statute would have
been encouraged to forego available legal remedies for an unconstitutional
uncounseled conviction and would have judged for themselves whether
their prior convictions had had a deficiency that now exempted them from
the gun law. Others might have claimed such a deficiency dishonestly,
making enforcement of the laws more difficult."
United States v. Tucker. The decision in Tucker73 barring the consider-
ation of uncounseled convictions in sentencing decisions would not have
been different under the proposed rule because there was a reasonable
alternative to having judges consider uncounseled convictions in sentencing
decisions, and because the defendant in Tucker had no access to the appli-
cation process required by the proposed rule. Judges could have fulfilled
the relevant sentencing objectives by considering only the factual evidence
underlying the prior conviction-evidence untainted by the lack of coun-
sel. 4 Under the proposed rule, the government would be prohibited from
introducing evidence of an uncounseled conviction to a sentencing judge
72. Cf. Brief for United States at 34-35, United States v. Lewis, 445 U.S. 55 (1980) (because of
missing or incomplete records court may have to accept uncontroverted allegations of defendant re-
garding prior record). Several sections of the federal gun law limit the flow of firearms to restricted
classes of individuals by requiring gun dealers to solicit and record detailed information about their
customers and by prohibiting gun dealers from selling to anyone whom they have reasonable cause to
believe may not lawfully receive a gun. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(c), (d), (m), (g) (1976). It would be
much more difficult for gun dealers and police officers to check whether an individual has a prior
counseled conviction than to check whether he has any outstanding conviction.
Exempting individuals with outstanding uncounseled felony convictions may also not be a reasona-
ble alternative since some individuals would be strongly discouraged from appealing their convictions
because a successful appeal might then expose them to regulation based on the newly outstanding
indictment, see 18 U.S.C. § 922 (1976), and the possible valid conviction, 18 U.S.C. § 1202 (1976),
that might result upon subsequent retrial. See supra p. 1010. Placing greater restrictions on individu-
als who successfully challenge their convictions than on those who leave their unconstitutional convic-
tions intact, and thereby encouraging individuals to protect their unconstitutional convictions from
reversal, is both illogical and contrary to the public interest. Moreover, burdening the full exercise of
constitutional prerogatives may also create an independent constitutional violation. Cf, e.g., North
Carolina v. Pierce, 395 U.S. 711, 724-25 (1971) (longer jail sentence upon retrial following successful
appeal prohibited because it would chill exercise of basic constitutional rights); United States v. Jack-
son, 390 U.S. 571, 581-83 (1968) (clause in Federal Kidnapping Act that removes possibility of death
penalty for defendants who waive right to jury trial prohibited for chilling exercise of basic constitu-
tional rights).
73. 404 U.S. 443 (1972).
74. Evidence that is produced in violation of the defendant's right to appointed counsel is tainted
and should not be considered in sentencing decisions because it would deprive the defendant of his
Sixth Amendment rights in the same manner as the consideration of an uncounseled conviction. But as
the Tucker Court pointed out, a sentencing judge is largely unrestrained in the kind of information he
may consider or the source from which it may come. 404 U.S. at 446. The breadth of information that
may be considered is illustrated by the fact that illegally seized evidence can be considered as long as it
was not seized for sentencing purposes. See, e.g., Verdugo v. United States, 402 F.2d 599 (9th Cir.
1968); United States v. Schipani, 315 F. Supp. 253 (E.D.N.Y.), af"d, 435 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1970).
The defendant's Sixth Amendment rights will not be violated if the government introduces un-
tainted factual evidence such as an arrest report because that evidence can be used whether or not the
government seeks a conviction in proceedings that require the appointment of counsel. Furthermore,
unlike an uncounseled conviction, an arrest report does not have a strong presumption of reliability,
and judges are experienced in evaluating their reliability.
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unless the government could show that it made an unsuccessful, good-faith
effort to find and submit untainted evidence." The proposed Sixth
Amendment rule will have a similar application to revocation proceedings
concerning a probation or parole restriction76 where the restriction stems
from a constitutional counseled conviction."
Loper v. Beto. The holding in Loper"8 that an uncounseled conviction
cannot be used to impeach a defendant's credibility is consistent with the
proposed Sixth Amendment rule because the defendant there had no ac-
cess to an application process that would permit him to challenge the gov-
ernment's use of the uncounseled conviction. Under the proposed rule, if
the government does not have the reasonable alternative of impeaching the
defendant with untainted evidence, it might be able to introduce evidence
of an uncounseled conviction for impeachment purposes, but only if it pro-
vides access to an application process before the presiding judge. 9 If it is a
75. This result is consistent with existing case law. Uncounseled convictions are not admissible in
revocation proceedings, see, e.g., Cottle v. Wainwright, 477 F.2d 269, 273, 275 (5th Cir. 1973), va-
cated on other grounds, 414 U.S. 895 (1973) (unconstitutonal uncounseled conviction must be ex-
cluded from parole revocation, but constitutional uncounseled conviction may be used); Clay v. Wain-
wright, 470 F.2d 478, 479-84 (5th Cir. 1972) (probation revocation vacated where based solely on
uncounseled conviction), but untainted evidence is admissible, see, e.g., Clay v. Wainwright, 470 F.2d
478, 479-84 (5th Cir. 1972) (rehearing of revocation proceeding without evidence of dncounseled
conviction permitted); State v. Harris, 312 So. 2d 643, 644 (La. 1975) (uncounseled conviction or
guilty plea cannot be used to revoke probation, but facts underlying conviction or guilty plea can be
used); Alexander v. State, 258 Ark. 633, 636, 527 S.W.2d 927, 930 (1975) (uncounseled misdemeanor
conviction punished only with fine cannot be used to revoke suspended sentence, but facts underlying
conviction can be used by themselves).
76. Constitutional procedural requirements are the same for probation and parole revocation pro-
ceedings. E.g., Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973); Van Dyke, Parole Revocation Hear-
ings in California: The Right to Counsel, 59 CALIF. L. REV. 1215, 1241-43 (1971).
77. While Scott allows uncounseled misdemeanor defendants to be convicted and punished with
probation restrictions, it does not allow them to be punished with imprisonment. Scott v. Illinois, 440
U.S. 367, 372-73 (1979). If the terms of probation are too severe, probation may be equated with
imprisonment for purposes of the Scott rule. See S. KRANTZ, C. SMITH, D. ROSSMAN, P. FROYD, & J.
HOFFMAN, RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES 31-32 (1976) [hereinafter cited as S. KRANTZ]; cf
Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963) (severe parole requirements equated with custody for
habeas corpus purposes); United States v. Kentucky, 372 F.2d 641 (2nd Cir. 1965) (severe probation
requirements equated with custody for habeas corpus purposes). Knowing this, the prosecuting gov-
ernment can appoint counsel for indigent misdemeanor defendants who have not waived their right to
counsel in cases where the government believes it may want to incarcerate the defendant for the crime
charged. If this alternative is not utilized, the government is barred from incarcerating the individual
for the original misdemeanor conviction as a result of a probation violation. See supra p. 1002;
Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 222, 224, 226-29 (1980); S. KRANTZ, supra, at 35-37. Even if Scott
and Baldasar were not construed to prohibit incarceration for a violation of probation for an uncoun-
seled misdemeanor conviction, it would be illogical to reach a different result. Since probation requires
the consent of the defendant, the uncounseled defendant could eliminate any chance of incarceration
by refusing any probationary offer. If the act that violates probation is independently illegal, the
defendant can be separately prosecuted and punished for that crime.
78. 405 U.S. 473 (1972).
79. An example of a circumstance in which the presiding judge might want to allow the collateral
use of an uncounseled conviction is when the conviction could be used for the purpose of directly
rebutting a specific false statement made from the witness stand (such as a statement that the defen-
dant had never been convicted of a felony). See Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 66-67 (1980);
Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473, 482 n.1 1 (1972) (plurality opinion). If the defendant's statement can be
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jury trial, the jury must be shielded from the application process so that
the result of the process is meaningful."0
The proposed Sixth Amendment rule's first constitutional requirement
also might not have been met in Loper because the admission into evi-
dence of a potentially unreliable uncounseled conviction for purposes of
impeachment might have been unnecessarily prejudicial, thus violating the
defendant's independent constitutional right to due process"' or to an im-
partial jury. 2 The same considerations of fundamental fairness apply to
both these rights.8 3 The courts have determined the degree of protection
afforded by these rights by balancing the defendant's interest in an unbi-
ased jury against the state's interest in protecting the public and providing
accurate adjudication. 4 While the extension of these independent constitu-
tional protections to a defendant with a prior counseled conviction might
be outweighed by the probative value of that conviction," the proposed
Sixth Amendment rule would not allow a reduction for a defendant with
an uncounseled conviction. If these independent constitutional rights were
infringed, the proposed Sixth Amendment rule would have prohibited the
collateral use of the uncounseled conviction for purposes of impeachment.
Burgett v. Texas and Baldasar v. Illinois. The proposed rule also leaves
Burgett and Baldasar intact. Governments have a reasonable alternative
method of satisfying the purposes of a recidivist statute without imprison-
rebutted without reference to the uncounseled conviction, however, the rule would still bar its use.
Evidence of a prior indictment, for instance, would sometimes be a reasonable alternative.
80. Research indicates that juries do not follow instructions concerning the proper use of informa-
tion about a defendant's criminal record, see H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 127-30,
160 (1966) (knowledge of defendant's prior criminal record significantly affects jury deliberations);
Note, To Take the Stand or Not to Take the Stand: The Dilemma of the Defendant With a Criminal
Record, 4 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 215, 217-18 (1968) (98% of attorneys and 43% of judges
responding to survey concluded that jurors cannot understand or follow courts' limiting instructions on
use of defendant's prior criminal record), and that a defendant is more likely to be convicted if the
jury is informed of his record. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra, at 160, 177-81; Project, supra note
27, at 1046-47 & nn. 848-49.
81. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV; see Project, supra note 27, at 1048 & n.862; Note, supra note
36, at 346-49; Note, Constitutional Problems Inherent in the Admissibility of Prior Record Convic-
tion Evidence for the Purpose of Impeaching the Credibility of the Defendant Witness, 32 U. CIN. L.
REV. 168, 173-80 (1968); Note, The Limiting Instruction-Its Effectivensss and Effect, 51 MINN. L.
REV. 264, 287 (1966).
82. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see Project, supra note 27, at 1048 & n.861; Note, supra note 36, at
346; Note, Constitutional Problems, supra note 81, at 173-80; see also Note, The Limiting Instruc-
tion, supra note 81, at 286 (Supreme Court "has never interpreted the Sixth Amendment to apply to
evidentiary practices which might periodically influence jurors," but it "would not be stretching the
meaning of. . . 'impartial' to preclude the introduction of other crimes' evidence prior to a finding of
guilt or innocence").
83. Note, supra note 36, at 346-48 & n.119; see, e.g., Groppi v. Wisconsin, 400 U.S. 505, 509
(1971); Baker v. Hudspeth, 129 F.2d 779, 781 (10th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 681 (1942).
84. See, e.g., People v. Laskowski, 166 Misc. 640, 644, 3 N.Y.S.2d 98, 102 (1938); Note, supra
note 36, at 347 & n.122, cf. Irwin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722-23 (1961) (defendant's right to
impartial jury limited by practical considerations-minor jury preconceptions acceptable).
85. See Project, supra note 27, at 1048 & n.863; Note, supra note 80, at 219-20.
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ing people for convictions supported by prior uncounseled convictions. 6
Rather than imposing special regulations solely on the basis of an uncoun-
seled conviction, the legislature, as suggested in Tucker, 7 could have given
judges enough sentencing guidance and discretion so that they could have
imposed punishments that reflected their knowledge about the individual
defendant.
Conclusion
The rule proposed by this Note strikes a compromise between Lewis
and the Supreme Court's other Sixth Amendment decisions, while leaving
all the existing cases intact. The rule seeks to protect the most important
government and individual interests with respect to collateral uses of un-
counseled convictions, to discourage collateral uses where the government
interest is not great, and to provide the individual with a remedial proce-
dure when an uncounseled conviction is used.
86. The recidivist statutes are also constitutionally suspect because of their particularly severe
encroachment on the right to appointed counsel. Under the statutes at issue, individuals regulated on
the basis of uncounseled convictions could only remove their disability by appealing their convictions.
See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 16-1(e) (1974); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38 §§ 1005-8-3(a)(1),-l(b)5, (c)(5)
(1975) (statutes that resulted in Baldasar conviction for recidivism); TEX. PENAL CODE art. 62 (1932)
(recidivist statute that resulted in Burgett conviction). This problem is not easily remedied because an
individual presumably could not remove his disability by establishing through an application that
presumptions about the class of individuals he is grouped with should not be applied to him individu-
ally, Since the specially regulated activity is already illegal for everyone, it would be ridiculous for an
individual to apply for reduced sanctions for committing future illegal acts on the ground that pre-
sumptions about his potential threat to society are false.
87. See United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446-47 (1972); supra p. 1014.
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